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1.  Introduction 
 
One goal of securities regulation is protection of the “ordinary” investor (Winter 1988).1  Some 
leading scholars, however, argue that ordinary (individual) investors deserve no special protections and, 
in fact, are “noise traders”2 that distort share prices (see, for example, Barber, Odean and Zhu 2005).3  
This distortion, if it exists, is troubling because of the important role accurate share prices play in the 
economy.  Stock prices serve as signals for the proper allocation of capital among firms, as investors use 
stock prices in making investment decisions (Durnev et al. 2003).  James Tobin (1982) describes the state 
of affairs when the stock market directs capital to its highest value use as “functional efficiency.”  
Functional efficiency requires accurate share prices (Durnev et al. 2003).   
Because of the importance of share price accuracy, researchers have struggled to understand the 
factors that affect share price accuracy.  The policy implications seem clear:  If individuals, as a group, 
act as noise traders, society might be better served if the direct participation of retail investors in securities 
markets were restricted.4  Indeed, Donald Langevoort (2002, 172-73), states: 
 
                                                 
1 Modern scholars of securities regulation assert that the goal of securities regulation should be the attainment of 
efficient financial markets to improve the allocation of resources in the economy (see, for example, Goshen and 
Parchomovsky 2006).  Of course, this goal and investor protection do not necessarily conflict.  Providing legal 
protection for ordinary investors is justified if, in doing so, the efficiency of the market functions they perform is 
enhanced (Winter 1988). 
2 Noise is that which is introduced into stock prices when investors trade, not based on company fundamentals, but 
on fads, rumors or other types of unreliable information.   
3 Share prices are accurate when they reflect fundamental value by serving as good predictors of future cash flows to 
shareholders over the life of the firm (see, for example, Fox et al. [2003] for a comprehensive discussion of the 
related concepts of “share price accuracy” and “share price informedness.”).  Share prices do this by incorporating 
information that predicts these future cash flows, rather than reflecting “noise.”   
4 Though eliminating individual investors from the capital markets seems politically infeasible, it is not implausible.  
One leading securities regulation scholar, Stephen Choi (2000), though not arguing that individual investors distort 
stock prices, has proposed an investor classification scheme (based on informational resources and market 
knowledge, as displayed on a licensing exam) that would prohibit direct investment in securities markets by 
unsophisticated investors.  In addition, (1) the recent proliferation, and then consolidation, of private trading 
platforms, which are open only to large institutional investors trading securities issued privately through Rule 144A 
offerings, and (2) the existence of alternative trading systems (so-called “dark pools”), designed to provide 
additional liquidity for institutional investors trading in public securities, demonstrate demand for trading venues 
that exclude individual investors.  Though it is perhaps unlikely that a private trading platform or alternative trading 
systems could replace our current deep, liquid public capital markets, the creation of a market with no or limited 
individual investor participation is at least possible. 
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“…[T]he more emotions and cognitive biases of noise traders adversely affect market prices, the 
more noise traders can be construed as "bad guys."  Good public policy would then be to 
eradicate these biases if possible, or at least neutralize their social and economic 
influence…[T]his is the deep concern about where the behavioral literature leads us:  if accurate, 
it invites regulation that privileges the savvy and treats unsophisticated traders as economic 
undesirables.” 
This Article provides evidence on the effect of individual investors on share price accuracy.  My 
examination of a new data set of New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) retail trading statistics shows that 
retail investor trading levels are significantly correlated with firm-specific stock return variation (also 
known as R2), a commonly used measure of share price accuracy.  Though there is controversy 
surrounding the correct interpretation of this metric, the dominant view among R2 adherents is the greater 
a stock’s firm-specific return variation (that is, the lower the R2), the more accurate its price.  The 
evidence in this study shows not only that increased levels of retail trading are associated with lower R2’s, 
but also that there is reason to believe the relationship is a causal one (that is, retail trading causes changes 
in R2).  Though the implications of these findings depend on the proper interpretation of R2, the evidence 
suggests that retail investors have a positive effect on share price accuracy and that restricting the access 
of large numbers of individual investors to equity markets is not only unwarranted, but also could harm 
market functioning.   
The Article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the existing literature surrounding noise 
trading and individual investors in an attempt to provide some context for the debate.  Section 3 describes 
the R2 methodology, and Section 4 describes the data used and analytical methodologies of this study.  
Section 4 also presents preliminary results.  Section 5 concludes and briefly considers the policy 
implications of this study’s findings. 
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The effects of irrational or noise traders on stock prices and market efficiency is a central issue in 
finance scholarship.  The traditional belief is that irrational traders cannot affect share prices over the long 
run.  Under this theory, trading based on mistaken beliefs will lead to trading losses against rational, 
informed investors and wealth reductions that will make it impossible for irrational traders to survive in a 
competitive marketplace (see, for example, Friedman 1953; Fama 1965).  Trades of irrational traders are 
random and uncorrelated, thus tending to cancel one another out and largely eliminating any price effects 
from such trading (see, for example, Friedman 1953; Fama 1965).  Therefore, as the theory goes, there is 
little reason to worry about the presence of noise traders.   
This traditional view has come under intense theoretical and empirical attack.5  In a theoretical 
study, Kogan et al. (2006) conclude that irrational traders can have a persistent effect on stock prices even 
if they do not “survive” (that is, the value of their trades is infinitesimal in relation to the total value of 
trades because they have suffered wealth reductions).  In addition, a large body of empirical analysis 
provides evidence that the trades of irrational investors are not random and do not cancel one another out.  
This evidence suggests that noise traders often act as a herd (see Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003] and Lux 
[1995] for a review of the literature related to herding behavior).  Thus, in the opinion of many in the 
finance and legal academies, noise trader risk is real, and protecting market efficiency requires creating a 
climate that can counteract the effects of noise traders (see, for example, Goshen and Parchomovsky 
2006; Langevoort 2002).6 
Most prior research shows that individual investors are more likely to make irrational or 
imprudent investment decisions than institutional investors are (Jackson 2003).  Barber, Odean and Zhu 
(2005) find that small trades (serving as a proxy for trades by individual investors) are correlated, buying 
by retail investors pushes prices too high (above their fundamental values), and selling by retail investors 
                                                 
5 As noted by Kogan et al. (2006, 195-96), De Long et al. (1990) argue, on the basis of a partial equilibrium model, 
that irrational traders hold portfolios with high growth and can potentially outgrow rational traders and thus survive.  
Conversely, Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2001), using general equilibrium models, conclude “irrational 
traders do not survive in the long run.” 
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pushes prices too low (below their fundamental values).  They conclude that individual investors (whom 
they term noise traders) can move equity markets.  Similarly, Hvidkjaer (2006), using trade size as a 
proxy for the trades of individual investors, conducts a study on individual investor trading patterns and 
concludes that there is a systematic component to retail trading and that such trading behavior can lead to 
or protract periods where a stock is over- or undervalued.  Kumar and Lee (2006) also find that retail 
investor trades are systematically correlated, that this concerted action can affect stock returns and that 
this “retail sentiment” does not appear to be an outgrowth of a reaction to factors related to fundamental 
value. 
But evidence from international markets calls into question the idea that retail investors are the 
noise traders in markets.  Jackson (2003), after analyzing a unique dataset of 41.9 million retail investor 
trades over an 11-year period on the Australian Stock Exchange,7 finds that, though individuals invest in 
a systematic fashion, it would not be appropriate to characterize their trading behavior as “irrational.”  
Indeed, the trades of individuals investing through full-service brokerage firms positively predict future 
market returns.8  Jackson states that one potential reason for this result could be individuals’ possession of 
valuable private information.   
In addition, Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001), based on a study of two years (1996-1998)9 of Korea 
Stock Exchange trading data, find that domestic retail investors10 possess a short-lived informational 
advantage over both foreign investors and domestic institutional investors.  An event study on trading 
behavior of different classes of investors around days on which stock prices have a 5% or more, in 
                                                 
7 According to Jackson, as of 2001, the U.S. market is 37 times as large as the Australian market (as measured by 
total market capitalization).  Also, in the U.S. retail investors own approximately 42% of the stock traded on U.S. 
markets.  In Australia, the percentage of individual investor ownership is 24%.  The U.S. and Australian markets are 
not strictly comparable, but Australia is one of the few markets in the world with sizable retail investor participation.  
Thus, Jackson’s study results should be interesting to those concerned about the effect of individuals on market 
functioning. 
8 Jackson examines trades from individuals that invest through 47 full-service brokerage firms and 9 Internet 
brokers.  Jackson reports that the trades of the full-service brokerage clients drive the study’s results. 
9 The Asian crisis of the late 1990’s and its market effects during the study period may affect the researchers’ 
findings and make the results ungeneralizable. 
10 Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) report that, at the time of the study, domestic retail investors were the most active 
traders on the Korea Stock Exchange, with their sales representing 77.4% of the gross value of stock sales in 1998.  
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absolute value, abnormal return reveals that domestic individual traders have a higher proportion of buy 
trades before the event than after and a lower proportion of sell trades before the event than after.  No 
other investor class studied exhibits this pattern.  These results suggest that individual investors in the 
aggregate are capable of predicting future corporate events.11  
This Article makes two new contributions to the literature.  First, it provides information to assess 
the noise trader claim against retail investors.  One of the benefits of this study is its use of direct New 
York Stock Exchange retail trading data and not individual investor trading proxies such as small share 
size12 or odd-lot trading.13  Those proxies suffer from some important limitations.14  First, using small 
share size as a proxy for trades by individual investors potentially can distort results.  Institutions often 
break up their trades into smaller batches to hide their intentions from other market participants or for 
other, liquidity-based reasons (Hvidkjaer 2006).  Thus, trades that appear to be made by individuals, 
given the small size, could actually be a portion of a trade made by an institutional investor.15  In 
addition, odd-lot trading data have a strong potential for underinclusiveness with respect to retail trading.  
Though any investor may trade in odd lots, a common belief is that individual investors of lower wealth 
are more apt to do so.  Using odd-lot trading as a proxy for the individual investor trading is problematic, 
however, because many individual investors trade in round lots;  indeed, there is evidence that they prefer 
                                                 
11 The database on which Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) rely does not distinguish between public market individual 
investors and company insiders.  Insiders, of course, may avail themselves of non-public information before trading, 
which, of course, would make it appear as though they can predict corporate events. 
12 Barber, Odean and Zhu (2005) recognize the limitations of small share size as a proxy for individual investor 
trading and do some limited testing of their data against actual brokerage firm data to gain comfort in the 
representativeness of their data sets. 
13 Odd-lot trading is trading a number of shares other than that which is required for a round lot (100 shares).  Wu 
(1972), in a study of individual investor trading behavior that used odd-lot trading data as a proxy for the trades of 
such investors, concludes that odd-lot trading has no effect on share prices.   For an example of a recent work using 
odd-lot trading data as a proxy for retail investor trading, see Brusa, Liu and Schulman (2005). 
14 Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008), in a study of retail investor behavior, use a proprietary data set of NYSE trades 
provided to the researchers directly by the NYSE.  They find that retail investor trades tend to follow certain 
patterns, but that there is no strong evidence that the trades of individuals are correlated.  Though their findings are 
relevant to the ongoing debate, they do not provide evidence that directly addresses the question of whether 
individual investors affect share price accuracy. 
15 Indeed, the average size of a market trade today is 260 shares, down from 1,400 shares a decade ago (Patterson 
and Lucchetti 2008). 
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to do so.16  Use of odd-lot data loses the impact of round-lot trading in study results.  This study’s second 
contribution to the literature is its examination of a relationship that has not yet been studied -- the 
relationship between retail trading activity and R2.  
3.  R2 
 
In this study, I use “R2” as a measure of share price accuracy.  “R2” is the R2 statistic obtained by 
regressing the individual returns of a firm’s stock on the returns of the market as a whole and the firm’s 
industry group (excluding the firm in question).  In statistics, R2 tells how much of the variation 
(expressed as a percentage) observed in a dependent variable (in this case, a firm’s individual stock 
return) is explained17 by the independent or explanatory variables (in this case, the market return and the 
industry return).  R2 takes the value of 0.0 – 1.0, with an R2 of 0.0 signifying that none of the variation in 
the dependent variable is explained by its relationship with the independent variables.  Conversely, an R2 
of 1.0 means that 100% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by its relationship with the 
independent variables.   
In this study, a high R2 means that much of the variation in an individual firm’s stock returns can 
be explained by the market return and the industry return.  In other words, the firm’s stock price is 
influenced primarily by movements in the market as a whole and stocks in the firm’s industry group.  
Conversely, a low R2 means that a firm’s stock price movements bear little relation to movements in 
market prices or stock prices of its industry peers.  There are two potential explanations for this 
occurrence:  1) Low R2 means that the firm’s stock price is more “informationally efficient” because it 
incorporates firm-specific (rather than market or industry) information and is therefore more “accurate” or 
2) Low R2 means the firm’s stock price reflects significant non-market or industry information, but such 
                                                 
16 See note 56 for further discussion. 
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information is noise, rather than information related to a company’s fundamentals (Roll 1988, Durnev et 
al. 2003).18  
In current finance scholarship, among R2 metric adherents,19 the former view prevails, but is 
controversial.  Resolving the R2 controversy is important for interpreting the finding of this study and 
others that rely on the R2 methodology.  What follows is a review of R2-related studies.  A number of 
prior studies suggest that R2 is consistent with greater share price accuracy, but several researchers have 
found evidence that leads them to reach the opposite conclusion.  Recent work by Dasgupta, Gan and Gao 
(2010) provides a path for reconciling the competing interpretations of R2, and, as I describe in Section 5, 
the instant study provides evidence consistent with their theory. 
Available evidence that a low R2 is a metric of informational efficiency and share price accuracy 
is strong.  Durnev et al. (2003) provide the most direct evidence on this question as they compare firm-
specific stock return variation (R2) and accounting-based measures of stock price informativeness.  They 
define stock price informativeness as the measure of how much information stock prices contain about 
future earnings, estimated from a regression of then-current stock returns on current and future accounting 
earnings.  Durnev et al. (2003) find that firm-specific variability (a lower R2) is positively correlated with 
their measures of stock price informativeness and conclude that low R2 is indeed a sign of share price 
accuracy and not noise impounded in share prices.  
In addition, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2001) find that firms operating in U.S. industries with 
lower R2’s use more external financing.  The authors suggest that this relationship is evidence that low R2 
is associated with stock prices that more closely track firm fundamentals.  In another study, Durnev, 
Morck, and Yeung (2004) find a strong correlation between firm-specific return variation and 
                                                 
18 Of course, a low R2 also could mean that a firm’s stock price moves largely independently of the market and its 
industry group and that the information compounded in its stock price is a combination of fundamental information 
and noise.  This explanation is quite plausible, but, as described in this section, researchers have provided evidence 
on whether one or the other explanation is more likely, rather than a little of both. 
19 One may argue that R2 is very similar to beta.  A high beta indicates that a stock’s returns closely track the returns 
of the overall market.  Under asset pricing theory, both high beta and low beta stocks operate in an environment that 
is assumed to be fully informed.  Thus, some may be skeptical of the claim that the R2 is a measure of share price 
accuracy.  However, I proceed under the assumption that the level of R2 reflects informational efficiency because 
this interpretation has been used extensively in recent finance scholarship.    
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economically efficient corporate investment.  They suggest that capital investment should be more 
efficient when stock prices are more informative because accurate prices give signals to both management 
and financial market participants about the quality of management’s investment decisions.  Presumably, 
managers may use this signal to change course when necessary, and investors, as Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung (2004) suggest, may use this signal to intervene as necessary in the face of poor management 
decisions.  Similarly, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) present evidence that fluctuations in stock prices 
affect the capital investment decisions of firms with low R2’s more than those with high R2’s.  The 
authors of the study conclude that this result serves as evidence of managers learning valuable 
information about company fundamentals from changes in stock prices and incorporating such new 
knowledge in their investment decisions. 
The conclusions the researchers draw in these studies of informational efficiency at the firm and 
industry level are consistent with evidence of R2 at the country level.  A number of studies show 
correlations between better functioning equity markets and greater firm-specific return variation (lower 
R2’s).  For example, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) calculate, inter alia, the average R2’s of the firms in 
each of 40 different countries.  The five countries with firms having the highest average levels of firm-
specific variation (lowest R2’s) are, in order, the United States, Ireland, Canada, the UK and Australia.  
The five countries with firms having the lowest average levels of firm-specific variation (highest R2’s) 
are, in order, Poland, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Turkey.  Overall, and with few exceptions, firms in 
low-income economies (measured by per capita GDP) have, on average, the highest R2’s.  This evidence 
is consistent with the intuition that firms in more well developed economies have more accurate share 
prices.  Similarly, researchers find that lower average firm R2’s are associated with more efficient capital 
allocation in a country (Wurgler 2000) and less country-level opaqueness20 (Jin and Myers 2006).   
The R2 methodology also has found adherents among the ranks of legal scholars.  For example, 
Fox, Morck, Yeung and Durnev (2003) conclude that enhanced mandatory disclosure rules adopted in the 
                                                 
20 Jin and Myers (2006, 281) define opaqueness as a “lack of information that would enable investors to observe 
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United States in December 1980 made share prices more accurate (as evidenced by a decrease in average 
R2 across firms).  Beny (2005) employs the country R2 statistics of Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) as a 
measure of share price informativeness and concludes that stronger formal insider trading laws in a 
country are associated with more informative share prices (that is, lower average R2) for firms within that 
country. 
Though a number of leading finance and legal studies use R2 as a metric of stock price 
informational efficiency, Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006) question the informational-efficiency interpretation 
of R2 and contend instead that R2 is a measure of price inefficiency.  They base this view on the results of 
independent empirical analysis and also point to the following studies as evidence consistent with their 
interpretation of R2.   
Chan and Hameed (2006) compare stock price synchronicity and research analyst activity in 
emerging markets and find that greater coverage by research analysts is associated with more stock price 
synchronicity in the market (lower firm-specific information in prices or higher R2’s).21    Based on these 
results, Chan and Hameed (2006) conclude that the conventional wisdom that research analysts produce 
firm-specific information is incorrect and that what analysts actually produce is market-wide information.  
Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006), however, point to this result as evidence that the R2 metric is not a measure 
of informational efficiency because one expects analysts to produce firm-specific information. 
The work of Veldkamp (2006) may help bridge the gap between these two opposing conclusions.  
Veldkamp (2006, 823) sets forth a model in which “investors purchase information that generates 
comovement.”  Consistent with this model, she argues, is the finding by Hameed, Morck and Yeung 
(2005) that firms (after controlling for size) with more analyst coverage tend to have fundamentals that 
predict other firms’ fundamentals.  Thus, the information provided by research analysts can produce 
comovement.  Veldkamp’s analysis suggests that finding that higher average R2 in a country is associated 
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with greater research coverage does not mean that it is implausible for low R2 to be consistent with more 
accurate share prices. 
There is additional evidence, however, that calls the prevailing interpretation of R2 into question.  
Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006) cite a study performed by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Gassen and LaFond (2006), 
which finds that (1) higher, not lower, R2’s are associated with more informative prices in the United 
States and Germany and (2) no statistically significant relationship exists between R2 and measures of 
stock price informativeness in the U.K., Australia, France or Japan.  Ashbaugh-Skaife, Gassen and 
LaFond conclude that there is no consistent relationship between R2 and stock price informativeness in 
international markets.   
Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2006) find that firms with low R2’s are more likely to have accounting-
based return anomalies, poor earnings quality and weak fundamentals.  Thus, rather than a metric of share 
price accuracy, these researchers assert that a low R2 is actually an indicator of the level of uncertainty 
faced by investors.  Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006) find evidence that stocks with lower R2’s exhibit what 
the researchers term “overreaction-driven price momentum” and more long run price-reversals.22    
Finally, legal scholar Ferrell (2003) reports the change of R2 in over-the-counter stocks (OTC) 
after passage of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments in the United States.  The 1964 Amendments 
extended mandatory disclosure requirements to over-the-counter stocks.  Before the 1964 amendments, 
these requirements applied only to exchange-listed stocks.  Ferrell finds that before OTC-mandated 
disclosure, the R2’s of OTC stocks were lower, on average, than those of listed stocks.  Ferrell states that 
it is “highly implausible” that the OTC market was more informationally efficient than the listed market 
before the 1964 amendments.  
Ferrell likely finds this outcome implausible because of the limited disclosure from OTC market 
firms before the amendments.  Ferrell reports that, in 1963, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                 
22 The researchers consider price momentum in a stock an outcome of investor overreaction.  Price momentum, a 
sign of informational inefficiency, is defined in their study as the presence of a phenomenon by which an investor 
could buy the “winning” stocks and short sell the “losing” stocks from a prior six-month period and generate 
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(SEC) completed a report on the state of securities regulation.  In its report, the SEC found that, of a 
random sample comprising approximately 20% of all OTC companies, 25% of the firms did not supply 
any financial data to their shareholders at all, and 23% did not certify their financial statements.  Of those 
firms that did provide financial data to their stockholders, 44% did not categorize their inventories, and 
33% failed to provide explanatory notes on significant financial matters, including depreciation methods, 
long-term contractual obligations and contingent liabilities, all of which firms with listed stocks were 
required to disclose. 
As demonstrated above, the prevailing view in the literature among R2 adherents is that R2 is a 
measure of price informativeness, but that view is controversial.  Lee and Liu (2007) attempt to reconcile 
the two competing interpretations of R2.  They hypothesize that the relationship between R2 and share 
price informativeness is not monotonic, but rather U-shaped.  They thus argue that when there is more 
firm-specific return variation in stocks that operate in good information environments,23 lower R2’s are a 
sign of more price informedness.  Conversely, for firms that operate in poor information environments, 
higher R2’s are a sign of more accurate prices.24  The idea is that if a firm operates in a good environment 
for information, then having more of the firm-specific variety will enhance share price accuracy.25   
Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) also set forth a theory that is highly persuasive in reconciling the 
competing views on R2.  The researchers argue that the R2 metric must be put into context vis-à-vis a 
firm’s transparency before the period over which R2 is calculated.  For example, consider, the researchers 
urge, the extreme case of Firm ABC that is “completely transparent” as of December 31, 2006 (that is, 
there is no firm-specific information about Firm ABC that is unknown to public market investors as of 
                                                 
23 Lee and Liu define a good information environment for a firm as one characterized by (1) higher institutional 
ownership, (2) longer time in existence, (3) lower research analyst forecast dispersion, (4) lower research analyst 
forecast error, (5) higher liquidity (greater ease of selling without affecting price) and (6) a lower probability that a 
market maker in a stock will trade with an informed trader (because most firm-specific information is already 
incorporated into the price).  The last characteristic is derived from a market microstructure model first set forth by 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, O’Hara (2005).  Interpreting lower values of this metric as a sign of greater price informativeness 
is controversial (see Lee and Liu 2007). 
24 The researchers rely on the information environment rather than the metric of informativeness used by Durnev et 
al. (2003) (that is, how well the price predicts future earnings) because of data availability and tractability given 
their research design. 
25 See Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2006) for evidence that calls into question certain elements of Lee and Liu’s (2007) 
theory of the U-shaped relationship between price informativeness and idiosyncratic volatility.   
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that date).  In this case, investors would have incorporated perfectly firm-specific data into the then-
current price.  If researchers were to regress the returns of Firm ABC on the market’s return, say, for 
example, from January 1 – December 31, 2007, they likely would find, according to the account of 
Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010), that the regression would yield an R2 of 1.0.  The authors argue that as 
firm-specific events unfold during 2007, the firm’s stock price would not move after these events because 
the market already would have anticipated the occurrence of such events (that is, there is no “surprise”).26  
The only area of uncertainty with respect to the appropriate price for Firm ABC’s stock is the effect of 
market-wide events on Firm ABC, which would explain the perfect comovement with the market return.  
Conversely, a firm that is “completely opaque” on December 31, 2006, likely would have a low R2 for the 
January 1 – December 31, 2007 period.  Thus, the researchers posit that firms that operate in better 
information environments are likely to have higher return synchronicity with the market.27   
4.  Data Sources, Sample, Methodology and Results of Analysis 
 
4.1 Data and Sample 
 
The period of this study is April 1, 2005 – August 31, 2006.  I obtained data on firm-level, 
industry-level and market returns, as well as share prices, shares outstanding, total volume and firm 
industry group from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  I acquired firm-level 
accounting data from the merged CRSP-Compustat database.28  I obtained data on firm-level retail 
trading activity, including total shares purchased and sold by retail investors on the NYSE each day29 for 
a particular stock30 from the NYSE ReTracEOD Summary.31  Institutional ownership data, based on the 
                                                 
26 This analysis assumes, of course, that the market would be able to incorporate the information into the price 
accurately. 
27 Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) also find empirical support for their theoretical assertions.  They find that older 
firms have higher R2’s, and that stock return synchronicity becomes significantly higher following equity issuance-
related disclosures. 
28 See Section 4.3 for a description of the accounting data used in this study. 
29 Retail trading data for April 21, 2006 are unavailable and, thus, are not a part of the sample.  However, because 
there is no reason to believe that retail trading behavior differed significantly on that date from other dates in the 
sample, this omission should not bias the overall conclusions of this Article. 
30 Though this figure does not represent all trading by retail investors in NYSE-listed stocks (only that executed on 
the NYSE), the study data should capture the overwhelming majority of the retail trading activity in NYSE-listed 
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quarter ended March 31, 2005, are from the Thomson Financial institutional holdings database.  The First 
Call database is the source of information on research coverage and research activity during the study 
period, and I derived news coverage information from Dow Jones News Service articles.  Finally, I 
obtained data on industry SIC codes, insider ownership and 5% holder ownership, as of March 31, 2005, 
from Thomson Financial’s Compact D SEC Disclosure.  
To construct a sample, I began with every NYSE-listed common stock32 in the CRSP database 
during the study period.33  I then eliminated from the sample any company that lacked data for the 
variables used in the study and all firms in industry groups with fewer than three members.34  My final 
sample for this study consists of 1,129 different stocks.  For all analyses, I report results derived from the 
overall sample, as well as results derived after splitting the sample into two approximately equal groups 
of 565 and 564 different stocks based on size (as determined by average market capitalization during the 
study period).  I refer to these groups as “Top Half” (the larger firms) and “Bottom Half” (the smaller 
firms).   
                                                                                                                                                             
the NYSE (see, for example, Goldstein et al. 2006).  There is no reason to believe that retail trades executed on the 
NYSE do not represent a similar proportion of overall retail trading activity in NYSE-listed shares.     
31 The NYSE generates ReTrac figures from information accompanying orders.  Every order executed on the NYSE 
must have an account-type designation (see ReTracEOD Data Discussion Board 2006; New York Stock Exchange 
2004, 29).  ReTrac EOD files track retail investor trades (defined as those made by accounts with the designation “I” 
(non-program trading, individual investor, as defined in NYSE Rule 80A)).  NYSE Rule 80A offers the following 
definition:  “‘Account of an individual investor’ means an account covered by Section 11(a)(1)(E) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.”  Exchange Act Section 11(a)(1)(E) covers the following accounts:  “… the account of a 
natural person, the estate of a natural person, or a trust (other than an investment company) created by a natural 
person for himself or another natural person.”  It is possible for brokers to execute individual investor trades along 
with institutional investor orders (and without the “I” designation), which could result in information from such 
retail trades not being included in the ReTrac data.  However, this occurrence generally is believed to be rare.    
32 Stocks include those classified by CRSP as “ordinary common shares” of share codes 10 (companies that have not 
been further defined), 11 (companies that need no further definition), 12 (companies incorporated outside the U.S.) 
and 18 (REITs). 
33 Firms that fail to trade on any day during the study period are excluded.  When a firm does not trade on a 
particular day, CRSP gives its daily return a value of “0.”  Including these firms in the sample would distort the R2 
calculation because the “0” value is not a reflection of investors’ collective decision to keep the stock at the same 
price after a day of trading, but rather the result of no trading activity at all.   
34 I cannot calculate R2 for firms operating in industries with fewer than three members because I cannot construct 
an “industry group” of two or more firms for use in the calculation.   
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4.2 Firm-Specific Stock Return Variation 
 
As a measure of share price informedness or accuracy, I use firm-specific stock return variation.  
Following the model of Durnev et al. (2003) and others, I obtain firm-specific stock return variation (R2) 
by use of the following regression: 
   ri,d ,t = αi,t + βi,t rm,d,t  + γi,t rj,d,t  + εi,d,t                                                                                                            (1) 
of firm i’s total returns ri,d,t on market return rm,d,t and a broad industry return rj,d,t, which includes the 
market value-weighted average return of all firms in industry j (defined as all firms in the same two-digit 
SIC code), excluding the firm in question.35  Returns are measured across d daily periods during the study 
period t (April 1, 2005 – August 31, 2006).  If the prevailing view in the literature among R2 adherents is 
correct, the lower the value of R2 generated from the above regression, the more firm-specific information 
there is incorporated into a firm’s stock price and the more accurate the price.  
4.3 Empirical Methodology and Results of Analysis 
My objective is to examine the relationship between firm-specific stock return variation and retail 
trading activity.  Consistent with the practice in the R2 literature, I use the logistic transformation36 of R2, 
New R2, as my dependent variable.37  I obtain New R2 by using the following formula: 
    New R2 = ln(R2i/1- R2i)              (2) 
In the regressions that follow, my independent variable of interest is retail trading.  (See Table 1 
for descriptive statistics for this study.)  I define retail trading activity as the proportion of the trading in a 
firm’s common stock that is executed by retail investors.  I calculate two measures of retail trading 
activity in this study:  1) the ratio of the number of shares of a firm’s stock bought by retail investors each 
trading day in the study period to the total number of a firm’s shares traded each day in the study period, 
                                                 
35 Consistent with Durnev et al. (2003), I exclude the firm in question to avoid spurious correlations between firm 
returns and industry returns for companies in industries with only a few firms. 
36 This is a common econometric remedy (see, for example, Morck, Yeung, and Yu 2000). The transformed variable 
is a continuous variable that is more normally distributed than R2, which has values between 0 and 1 (Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Gassen and LaFond 2006). 
37 In unreported results, I run the regressions described in Section 4.3 below using R2, instead of New R2.  My 
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averaged over the study period (“buy-side retail trading”) and 2) the ratio of the number of shares of a 
firm’s stock sold by retail investors each trading day in the study period to the total number of a firm’s 
shares traded each day in the study period, averaged over the study period (“sell-side retail trading”).   
I control for variables that may affect share price accuracy.  I control for level of 
“INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP” (defined as the proportion of a firm’s stock held by institutions as of 
March 31, 2005)38 because there is reason to believe that firms with a largely institutional shareholder 
base may be more likely, in response to shareholder demand, to provide specific earnings guidance and 
make voluntary disclosures about their business prospects that can help the market more accurately 
establish prices for the firms’ shares.  My control variables also include “SIZE” (measured as a firm’s 
average market capitalization (closing share price x number of shares outstanding) during the study 
period) and “VOLUME” (average daily volume of total shares traded in a firm’s stock during the study 
period) because larger, more liquid firms are more likely to have a large investor following and generate 
more interest and, potentially, private information.  I account for the effects of research analysts who 
disseminate firm-specific information into the marketplace with two variables:  1) the number of different 
analysts that cover the firm (as evidenced by the publication of earnings estimates) during the study 
period (“RESEARCH COVERAGE”) and 2) the total number of earnings per share estimates released by 
analysts for a firm during the study period (“RESEARCH ACTIVITY”).  Because controllers or other 
insiders may possess superior private information about a firm’s prospects, but also, conversely, may 
make firms less transparent (see, for example, Pizarro et al. 2007), I control for the proportion of a firm’s 
stock held by insiders (for example, directors and officers) (“INSIDER OWNERSHIP”) and for the 
proportion of a firm’s stock held by individuals or institutions with 5% or greater stock ownership in the 
                                                 
38 One should note that because the institutional ownership variable is based on Form 13-F data (all institutions with 
$100 million or more in securities under discretionary management are required to report their holdings to the SEC 
each quarter), the variable only represents stock owned by large institutions (that is, those with $100 million or more 
in assets under management) and does not account for shares held by small institutions.  One also should note that 
because of duplicative reporting by institutions on the required Form 13-F’s some firms in the study sample have 
institutional ownership percentage values that, as calculated, exceed 100% (Other researchers have found that such 
instances of duplicative reporting are generally rare (see, for example, Thakor, Nielsen and Gulley 2005) and, thus, 
the figures, though anomalous, should not bias this study’s results significantly.  In the instant study, 65 of the 1,129 
stocks in the sample (5.8%) have institutional ownership percentages that, as calculated, exceed 100%).   
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company (“5% OWNER OWNERSHIP”).39  Diversified conglomerates may be more difficult for 
investors to understand and value or may track the market more closely because they operate in more 
segments of the economy.  I, therefore, control for firm-level diversity (“DIVERSITY”), measured by the 
number of four-digit SIC codes in which the firm operates.40  In addition, I control for firm news 
coverage (“NEWS COVERAGE”) during the study period41 because media attention affects the amount 
of firm-specific information in the marketplace.  News coverage also may affect the trading behavior of 
retail investors, as Barber and Odean (2008) find that individual investors are attracted to stocks that 
capture their attention for a number of reasons, including by being featured in news stories.   
                                                
I also employ a number of additional controls suggested by the work of Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) that are related to share price accuracy.  Baker and Wurgler argue that stock mispricings result 
from “both an uninformed demand shock and a limit on arbitrage.”  Investor sentiment, they argue, may 
vary across firms and affect prices in the following manner.  Using one possible definition of investor 
sentiment as the “propensity to speculate,” Baker and Wurgler suggest that investor sentiment may drive 
 
39 A more apt variable would be the proportion of trades represented by insiders or 5% holders, rather than 
ownership by such investors, but this trading information is not currently available in a comparable format to that of 
the retail trading data I use in this study. 
40 In unreported results, I use, as an alternative, four dummy variables in my regression representing the four-
categories of diversification suggested by Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987).  Under this formulation, I calculate a 
firm’s level of “broad spectrum diversity (BSD),” measured as the number of two-digit SIC code industries in which 
a firm operates and a firm’s level of “mean narrow spectrum diversity (MNSD),” defined as the number of four-digit 
SIC code industries in which a firm operates.  Firms with BSD levels below the mean of my sample population are 
characterized as “low” BSD firms, and firms with BSD levels above the mean of my sample population are 
characterized as “high” BSD firms.  Similarly, firms with MNSD levels below the mean of my sample population 
are characterized as “low” MNSD firms, and firms with MNSD levels above the mean of my sample population are 
characterized as “high” MNSD firms.  Firms that have both low BSD and low MNSD are “Category 1” firms or 
those with “very low diversity.”  Firms that have both high BSD and high MNSD are “Category 4” firms or those 
with “very high diversity.”  Firms with low BSD, but high MNSD are “Category 2” firms or “related-diversified” 
firms.  Firms with high BSD, but low MNSD are “Category 3” firms or “unrelated-diversified” firms.  My results 
remain qualitatively unchanged when I employ these dummy variables instead of the one based simply on the 
number of four-digit SIC codes. 
41 Consistent with prior studies, I calculate level of news coverage by hand counting the number of days during the 
study period on which a firm is featured prominently in a Dow Jones News Service story.  “Featured prominently” 
means being mentioned by name either in the headline or lead paragraph.  I use number of days of coverage, rather 
than the number of individual news stories, to avoid the possibility of counting multiple, essentially identical stories 
appearing in the Dow Jones News Service on the same day.  Counting duplicate news stories could provide a 
distorted view of the amount of information disseminated to the public marketplace.  Note, however, in a separate 
regression, I use the raw number of news stories over the study period as the “news coverage” independent variable.  
In unreported results, I find the outcome does not change qualitatively from the results in the original regression as 
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the demand for speculative investments.  They also argue that what makes a firm’s stock particularly 
vulnerable to investors’ propensity to speculate lies in large part in the subjectivity of the firm’s valuation.  
Firms that are young and unprofitable and that have extreme growth prospects allow unsophisticated 
investors to defend “with equal plausibility” a wide range of valuations that are consistent with the 
investors’ general market sentiment (that is, either general pessimism or optimism).  This form of 
speculation is more difficult to do with firms with a long, established earnings history, tangible assets and 
stable dividends. 
Similarly, firms with characteristics that make arbitrage (to offset any noise trading or speculative 
tendencies) difficult are also more subject to mispricing.  Drawing on prior research that shows that 
arbitrage is particularly costly and risky for stocks of young, small, unprofitable, extreme growth or 
distressed firms, Baker and Wurgler posit that such firms are more likely to be mispriced.42  The stocks 
that are the hardest to value are also the most difficult to arbitrage.   
I therefore adopt the following additional controls:  “AGE” (firm age, measured, to the nearest 
month, as the number of months the firm has appeared in CRSP),  “VOLATILITY” (stock volatility, 
measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over my 17-month study period),43 two 
variables related to profitability -- “RETURN ON EQUITY”44 and a dummy variable for whether a firm 
is profitable (that is, has positive earnings), two variables related to dividend payments -- “DIVIDENDS-
                                                 
42 As Baker and Wurgler (2006, 1649-50, citations omitted) explain, “First, [the stocks’] high idiosyncratic risk 
makes relative-value arbitrage especially risky.  Moreover, such stocks tend to be more costly to trade and 
particularly expensive, sometimes impossible, to sell short.  Further, their lower liquidity exposes would-be 
arbitrageurs to predatory attacks.” 
43One could argue that a useful measure for comparison purposes would be relative standard deviation of returns, 
calculated as standard deviation divided by the mean, rather than the raw standard deviation as used by Baker and 
Wurgler.  Relative standard deviation is used to compare the variability of data when the means of the data (here, 
firms’ average stock returns) are significantly different across the sample.  I run the regression analysis described in 
this Section 4.3 using both standard deviation and relative standard deviation and in unreported results find that 
though standard deviation is a significant variable in the regression, relative standard deviation is not.  However, the 
relationship between retail trading (the variable of interest) and R2 is qualitatively identical in both formulations. 
44 Return on equity is defined as earnings/book equity.  Earnings (E) is income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat Item 18) plus income statement deferred taxes (Compustat Item 50), minus preferred dividends 
(Compustat Item 19).  Book equity (BE) is stockholders’ equity (Compustat Item 60) plus balance sheet deferred 
taxes (Compustat Item 35).  All references to Compustat Item numbers in this note and the ones to follow, unless 
otherwise noted, are for the year 2004 (that is, the year immediately before the beginning of the study period). 
 17
18
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 75 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art75
TO-EQUITY”45 and a dummy variable for whether a firm pays dividends (that is, has positive dividends 
per share), two variables related to asset tangibility -- the ratio of “TANGIBLE ASSETS TO TOTAL 
ASSETS” and the ratio of “RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES TO TOTAL ASSETS,”46  
and three variables to proxy for characteristics indicating high growth opportunities and/or distress -- 
“BOOK-TO-MARKET EQUITY,”47 “LEVEL OF EXTERNAL FINANCE,”48 and “SALES 
GROWTH.”49  Table 2 contains pairwise correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in 
this analysis. 
After performing a regression analysis using firm-specific return variation (R2) as the dependent 
variable, and all of the above explanatory variables, I run several types of regression diagnostics.  A check 
of the normality of residuals and the existence of a linear relationship between the dependent variable and 
the explanatory variables reveals that a number of the independent variables are problematic.  Thus, to 
correct for this deficiency where warranted, I express the values of certain variables in natural logarithms.  
The variables requiring this treatment and for which I provide the requisite transformation50 include buy-
side retail trading, sell-side retail trading, market capitalization, trading volume, research activity, insider 
                                                 
45 Dividends-to-equity is defined as dividends/book equity.  Dividends are the dividends per share at the ex date 
(Compustat Item 26) times Compustat shares outstanding (Compustat Item 25) divided by book equity, as defined in 
note 44 above. 
46 Tangible assets to total assets is defined as property, plant and equipment (Compustat Item 7) divided by total 
assets (Compustat Item 6).  Research and development expenses to total assets is defined as R&D expense 
(Compustat Item 46) divided by total assets (Compustat Item 6).  Consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006), 
missing values of R&D expense are set to zero.  As a robustness check, I run the regression analysis described in 
this Section 4.3 first, including all firms in the sample and then, excluding firms with missing R&D values.  In 
unreported results, I find that the outcomes are qualitatively identical. 
47 Book to market equity is book equity (defined in note 44 above) divided by a firm’s average market capitalization 
during the study period. 
48 External finance is defined as the change in assets (Compustat Item 6) from 2003 to 2004 minus the change in 
retained earnings (Compustat Item 36) over the same period divided by total assets (Compustat Item 6). 
49 Sales growth is the change in net sales (Compustat Item 12) from 2003 to 2004 divided by 2003 net sales.  In 
addition, the firms in the sample are divided into deciles by sales growth, with firms with the highest level of sales 
growth considered “extreme growth” firms.  In addition, firms in the top three deciles are considered “high growth” 
firms, and firms in the bottom three deciles are considered “low growth firms.” 
50 The variables for return on equity, sales growth, and external finance show some evidence that they require this 
treatment, as well, but the conclusion is not clear.  I, therefore, leave these variables in the regression in their 
unaltered state.  I run a regression analysis using transformed variables for return on equity, sales growth and 
external finance, and my overall results remain qualitatively unchanged from those I report in this Section 4.3.  I, 
however, lose almost 500 observations.  I lose such a large portion of my sample following this transformation 
because a significant number of the firms in my sample have negative values for these variables, for which a 
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ownership, dividends-to-equity, R&D-to-assets and age in months.51  As a check against outliers and 
influential data points,52 I winsorize all independent variables at their 0.5% and 99.5% values, as in Baker 
and Wurgler (2006). 
To address multicollinearity problems revealed by regression diagnostics, I performed principal 
component analysis.  Principal component analysis derives alternative independent variables that a 
researcher may put into a regression equation by giving the pre-existing variables different weights and 
generating a “blended” explanatory variable that the researcher may use in the regression instead.  In this 
analysis, I generated two new variables using this methodology:  1) “retail trading,” which combines buy-
side retail trading and sell-side retail trading and 2) “size, volume and research,” which combines market 
capitalization, trading volume, research coverage and research activity.  In addition, my model excludes 
1) the profitability dummy because it is highly correlated with return on equity, 2) the dividend payer 
dummy because it is highly correlated with dividends to equity and 3) all the sales growth dummies 
because they are highly correlated with the sales growth variable.53   
My regression takes the form: 
2ln( iR /(1- )) = α + βRETTRADEi  + γ1Ii  + γ2SIZEVOLRESi + γ3INSOWNi  + γ45PEROWNi + γ5DIVERSEi + 
γ6NEWSDAYSi + γ7AGEi  + γ8STKVOLi  + γ9RETONEQi  + γ10DIVTOEQi  + γ11TANGASSETSi  + γ12RDTOASSETSi  
+ γ13BKTOMKTi  + γ14EXTFINi  + γ15SALESGi  + εi                                                                              (3) 
2
iR
where RETTRADE is the variable representing the proportion of trading by retail investors, I is 
institutional ownership, SIZEVOLRES represents a combined variable including size, trading volume, 
research coverage and research activity, INSOWN is insider ownership, 5PEROWN is five percent owner 
ownership, DIVERSE is a dummy variable that takes the value one for firms that operate in more than two 
                                                 
51 In addition, for the variables insider ownership, dividends-to-equity, and R&D-to-assets, I replace all zero values 
with a small constant (0.001) to allow the calculation of the natural log.  However, with or without the addition of 
this constant, my results are qualitatively the same. 
52 Through the regression diagnostics process, I learned that two of the firms in my sample consistently have values 
that are outliers.   Performing the regression analysis without these two firms causes no qualitative changes in my 
results, as described in this Section 4.3. 
53 I run one regression analysis using the new variables as described in this paragraph and another that includes each 
independent variable separately.  In unreported results, I find that the results are qualitatively identical. 
 19
20
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 75 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art75
industries, as indicated by four-digit SIC codes, NEWSDAYS is the number of days during the study 
period on which a firm is prominently featured in a news story, AGE is age, in months, STKVOL 
represents the volatility of a firm’s stock, RETONEQ is return on equity, DIVTOEQ is dividends to 
equity, TANGASSETS is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets, RDTOASSETS is the ratio of R&D 
expenses to total assets, BKTOMKT is book-to-market equity, EXTFIN is level of external financing, and 
SALESG is sales growth. 
Table 3 reports the results of this regression, including t-statistics and robust standard errors, for 
the overall sample and shows that higher proportions of retail trading activity are positively associated 
with firm-specific return variation (that is, a lower R2).  This result is statistically significant (p-value < 
0.01).     
Because of the controversy with respect to the correct interpretation of R2, one must approach the 
above results with some caution.  However, if a low R2 is a sign of share price accuracy, then the results 
demonstrate that increased levels of retail trading are associated with more accurate share prices. 
4.3.1  Industry Considerations 
 
Some firms move more closely with the market because they are more sensitive to general 
economic conditions (see Durnev et al. [2003] for a general discussion of this point).  Thus, it would not 
be fair to say that the stock prices of such firms are “less accurate” because market-wide factors largely 
drive their fundamentals (for example, earnings).  To address this potential concern, in unreported results, 
I perform separate intra-industry regressions of the type described above using a sample of firms in 
industries that are particularly sensitive to macroeconomic factors (for example, construction companies, 
finance companies).  My overall results still hold qualitatively.  Although certain firms are more sensitive 
to market factors than others, my results reveal that, within groups of such “sensitive” firms, the level of 
retail trading has a statistically significant negative relationship with R2.  
4.3.2  Size Effects 
 
To assess whether firm size matters with respect to R2, I perform additional analyses.  Firm size 
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in the sample (the “Top Half”) have higher R2’s than the smallest firms in the sample (the “Bottom 
Half”).  At first blush, this is counterintuitive.  If the prevailing view among R2 adherents is correct, then 
this finding implies that larger NYSE firms, as a group, have less accurate stock prices than smaller firms.  
However, recall the arguments of Lee and Liu (2007) and Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) with respect to 
R2.  The larger firms relative to the smaller firms are more likely to operate in information-rich 
environments.  Thus, consistent with the claims of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010), these firms, as a 
group, appear to have less firm-specific information impounded into their prices during the study period, 
likely because the market largely had anticipated firm-specific news from these firms.   
I also find that retail trading in firms of different sizes is associated with R2 in different ways.  I 
perform separate regressions including first, only the largest firms in the sample (the “Top Half”) and 
then only the smallest firms in the sample (the “Bottom Half”).   
The results in Table 3 reveal that higher levels of retail trading are associated with lower R2’s in 
the overall sample and in the Top Half and Bottom Half size groups.  However, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between retail trading activity and R2 in the Top Half size group.  This outcome 
demonstrates that the relationship between retail trading and R2 is stronger for relatively smaller54 firms. 
4.3.3  Causation 
 
Though the results described above demonstrate that retail investor trading is correlated with 
firm-specific return variation, I have not established that retail investor trading causes changes in firm-
specific return variation.  There may be no causal link or the causation may run in the opposite direction.  
For example, individual investors may be attracted to firms with lower R2’s, and the presence of such 
investors may have no effect on a stock’s R2.  Retail investors that are trying to “beat the market” may be 
more inclined to invest in stocks that have high firm-specific variation, or stockbrokers’ recommendations 
to their individual investor clients also may tend to consist largely of stocks that have experienced recent 
movement due to idiosyncratic factors.  Finally, firms with greater firm-specific information may garner 
                                                 
54 I use the term “relatively smaller” because all firms in the study are NYSE firms and among the largest 
corporations in the United States.   
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more publicity and, thus, attract more retail investors.  Consistent with that hypothesis, Barber and Odean 
(2008) provide evidence that individual investors are attracted to stocks that “catch the attention” of such 
investors through extreme price moves, abnormal trading volume and, as noted previously, news 
coverage.55  Determining the existence and direction of causation is important for interpreting the results 
of this study. 
There is no way to know with certainty whether retail trading causes changes in R2.   But 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation is widely used by econometricians to determine the existence of 
causal relationships and address simultaneity concerns.  In this study, through the two-stage least squares 
method of IV estimation, I, in the first stage, predict retail trading by using a factor (instrument) that is not 
directly related to R2.  I then, in the second stage, use an IV estimator and the first stage “predicted” 
results to estimate the effect of retail trading on R2.  “Stock price” is the instrument I use for retail trading.  
“Stock price” is equal to a firm’s average stock price during the study period.  Like the independent 
variables used in the regressions in this study, average stock price in the IV estimation is winsorized at its 
0.5% and 99.5% value. 
To be a valid instrument, stock price must be correlated with (i) the proportion of retail trading in 
a stock (RETTRADE) and (ii) R2, but only indirectly through the proportion of retail trading 
(RETTRADE).  The instrument also must be sufficiently strong (that is, have a high correlation with the 
independent variable of interest, RETTRADE).  Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) suggest that 
individual investors may prefer stocks trading within certain price ranges because of cost concerns.  One 
can imagine an individual investor of relatively modest means that prefers to purchase stock in round 
lots.56  To this investor, a stock with a price of $9 may be significantly more attractive than one trading at 
                                                 
55 It should be noted that, as shown on Table 2, there is not a positive correlation between the level of retail trading 
and news coverage.  Level of a firm’s media attention is, in part, a function of size (the correlation between news 
coverage and market capitalization is 0.58), and size is inversely correlated with the proportion of trading in a firm’s 
stock by retail investors.  However, in unreported regression results, I find strong evidence that as the level of news 
coverage increases, the level of retail trading increases, holding size constant. 
56 The reason for a round lot preference likely is not rooted in concerns about transaction cost differentials.  Angel 
(1997, 62) notes that the odd-lot differential (that is, higher execution costs for odd lot purchases and sales) has been 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009
$90 simply because the former is viewed as more affordable (at a total cost per round lot of $900 for the 
former and $9,000 for the latter).  Similarly, if an investor desires diversification (assuming she relies on 
direct investment rather than investment through intermediaries such as mutual funds for this purpose) 
and has limited funds available for investment, she may have little choice other than to buy stocks with 
lower absolute prices to achieve her diversification goals (see Dhar et al. 2004).  Grullon, Kanatas, and 
Weston (2004) employ the reciprocal of stock price as a control variable in a regression assessing the 
effect of advertising on stock ownership and find a statistically significant relationship (at the 1% level) 
between stock price and the absolute number of total investors in a firm.57   
The results of the IV analysis in this study for the overall sample appear in Table 4.  Consistent 
with the findings and hypothesis of Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, the relationship between the 
proportion of retail trading and stock price is negative.  The first stage results suggest that stock price is a 
strong instrument for retail trading (F-statistic = 47.81).  In addition, the correlation between retail trading 
and stock price (-0.45) is strong. 
In addition to statistical evidence suggesting that stock price is a strong instrument, qualitative 
reasons to believe the instrument is valid exist.  The absolute level of stock price is only indirectly 
correlated with R2.  Stock price level is unlikely to be directly correlated with R2 because absolute stock 
price level should have no effect on share price accuracy or firm-specific return variation.  Whether a 
stock trades at $9 or $90 is an irrelevant consideration with respect to how informative that price is or 
whether the stock’s returns are correlated with the overall market or the firm’s industry group.  Absolute 
stock price is an arbitrary figure, devoid of informational content.  Though the dependent variable in the 
main regressions in this study (R2) is derived from a regression whose dependent variable is stock price 
                                                                                                                                                             
reluctant to trade in odd lots.”  Similarly, Dhar et al. (2004, 19), which examine trading behavior around stock splits, 
note that though the difference in costs for odd-lot trading and round-lot trading are insignificant during their sample 
study period (1991-1996), “individual investors tend to like trading in hundreds of shares” and further state that 
approximately 82% of all common stock trades are round-lot trades. 
57 Note, however, that they fail to find a statistically significant relationship between stock price and the absolute 
number of institutional investors in the firm.   
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returns, returns, which reflect relative stock price movements, are independent of absolute stock price 
levels.  
The following simple example illustrates this point.  Imagine two identical (with the exception of 
stock price) firms, each with a current market capitalization of $500 million.  Firm A’s stock price is $10 
per share, and it has 50 million shares outstanding.  Firm B, with 25 million shares outstanding, has a 
stock price of $20.  If both Firm A and Firm B experience a negative profitability shock that changes the 
market’s estimate of the firms’ value from $500 million to $450 million, the stock prices of both firms 
will decline by 10% (Firm A’s to $9 per share and Firm B’s to $18 per share).  Though the “pre-shock” 
and “post-shock” prices are different for Firm A and Firm B, the percentage decline (the return) is the 
same.  Prices and returns are independent, so stock price is likely a valid instrument. 
One may argue that this conclusion is not free from doubt because there is some evidence that 
returns can be related to absolute stock price level.  For example, Gaunt, Gray and McIvor (2003, 33), in a 
study on Australian equity market returns, find that share prices, independent of firm size, affect portfolio 
returns.  Similarly, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992, 553) find a low price stock January effect (that is, the 
stocks earn abnormal returns in January).58  Bhardwaj and Brooks characterize this result as a low price 
phenomenon because they, like Gaunt, Gray and McIvor, find that the return effects appear generally in 
stocks with low prices.  Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992, 559) suggest that arguments used in the past to 
explain the anomalous returns of small firms (for example, illiquidity, inaccurate risk assessment, neglect, 
and transaction costs) can be applied with at least as much force to low price stocks.  There is little reason 
to suspect that the low price phenomenon would affect the results of this study significantly, however.  
This sample contains firms with relatively high share prices, as the median stock price is $32.89.59  
                                                 
58 Note that these abnormal returns disappear when factoring in transaction costs and bid-ask bias to returns in the 
1977-1986 period.   
59 Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992, 556) use the following five groups to segment their sample by stock price:  $5 or 
less, $5 - $10, $10 - $15, $15 - $20, and more than $20.  Under this construction, stocks whose prices exceed $20 
clearly are not low-priced.  In addition, the median August 2006 (the final month of this study’s analysis period) 
month-end stock price for the entire CRSP database is $17.09 (excluding firms with “$0” reported stock prices).  
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Therefore, the available evidence suggests that stock price is a valid instrument for retail trading in this 
context.60 
The second stage regression demonstrates the effect retail trading has on R2.  This regression 
shows how R2 varies with conditions (higher or lower stock prices) that tend to be associated with lower 
or higher levels of retail trading.  As shown in Table 4, the coefficient for retail trading is negative;  as the 
proportion of retail trading across firms in the sample increases, R2 decreases.  The retail trading 
coefficient in the instrumental variable estimation is statistically significant.  The results of IV estimation 
analysis using the Top Half and Bottom Half size groups, also shown in Table 4, are qualitatively 
identical to those for the overall sample.61 
If the assumptions described in this sub-section are correct, the stock price could not cause a firm 
to have low or high R2; stock price has no direct effect on R2.  Thus, the results of this analysis provide 
evidence that the level of a firm’s R2 is caused at least in part by the effect of stock price on the level of 
retail trading and, in turn, by the effect of retail trading on R2.  Though causality may run in both 
directions, through the use of this source of exogenous variation (the stock price, which causes one 
variable (retail trading) to change but not the other (R2)), I am able to determine the existence of one of 
the directions of causation and infer the nature and strength of the relationship between retail trading and 
R2.  This analysis suggests that retail trading causes changes in firm-specific return variation.    
4.4  Study Limitations 
 
This study suffers from two limitations.  First, it relies on a sample that includes only a subset of 
publicly traded firms – NYSE-listed companies only.  The sample does not include the broader universe 
                                                                                                                                                             
used in this study, with an overall median price of $32.89 and 865 firms (76.6% of the sample) with a price of more 
than $20 and only 28 firms (2.5%) with a stock price of under $5, are not, on the whole, low-priced stocks.   
60 One could argue that low-stock price companies are inherently more volatile, which could result in lower R2’s for 
such companies.  Even if this were true, it would not affect the utility of stock price as an instrument.  In this 
instance, just as described above, stock price still would be correlated with R2 only indirectly, as it is not the price 
itself, but rather characteristics of  firms with low prices that are correlated with volatility.  In addition, just as 
discussed in note 59 above, few of the firms in this study’s sample are low-priced stocks. 
61 Unlike in the OLS regressions, here in the IV estimation, the retail trading coefficient is significant in the Top 
Half size group.  The coefficients for all size groups also are significantly larger (on an absolute basis) in the second 
stage of the IV estimation than in OLS.  This is likely due to the potential reverse causation problem identified in 
this section.  However, just as in the OLS, the relationship between retail trading and R2 is stronger in the Bottom 
Half size group than in the Top Half size group. 
 25
26
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 75 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art75
of firms traded on other exchanges or markets.  This is unavoidable given the lack, for non-NYSE 
companies, of direct (non-proxy), market-wide retail trading data of the sort used in this study.  However, 
using this sample of NYSE firms allows one to test the relationship between R2 and retail trading among 
firms that, relative to the broader market, operate in what could be termed a good information 
environment.  
Second, the available data make it impossible to separate the trades of retail investors who are 
advised by a broker or other financial professional from the trades of individuals that make investment 
decisions independently.62  The distinction is meaningful to the extent we hope to draw conclusions about 
the investment capacity of retail investors to inform securities regulation policy.     
5.   Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This Article offers evidence that higher levels of trading by retail investors are associated with 
more firm-specific return variation (lower R2).  The relationship is stronger among the smaller firms in 
the sample than among the larger firms.  This result is reasonable given the differences in retail trading in 
the larger and smaller firms.  As shown in the summary statistics on Table 1, though retail investors on 
average represent a small proportion of overall stock trading volume, they represent almost twice as much 
trading volume on a proportional basis for the relatively smaller firms as they do for the relatively larger 
firms.  Thus, for the smaller firms, there is more opportunity for the trades of retail investors to have a 
meaningful impact on stock price movements.   
This Article also provides some evidence that the relationship between retail trading and R2 is 
causal.  However, because of the controversy surrounding the correct interpretation of R2 (that is, whether 
low R2 is a sign of greater share price accuracy or greater informational inefficiency), the results of this 
study do not have clear policy implications.  If the dominant view among R2 adherents is correct (that is, 
lower R2’s imply greater share price accuracy), then the findings of this study suggest that, contrary to the 
received wisdom, the presence of retail investors, as a group, in equity markets increases share price 
accuracy.  Therefore, the instant study not only calls into question the need for policy changes to restrict 
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the access of retail traders, but also provides support for efforts to protect individual investors and 
increase their market participation.  But if the predominant view is wrong, and a low R2 is not a sign of 
share price accuracy, but rather a sign of the presence of greater noise in share prices, then the results of 
this study could lend support to the notion that individual investors are noise traders. 
This study is not intended to, nor can it, resolve the controversy surrounding the correct 
interpretation of R2.  However, it does yield insights that can contribute to the debate.  As described in 
Section 3, Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) argue that the quality of information environment is important 
in interpreting R2.  They assert that a firm in a high quality information environment is more likely to 
have a high R2 during any defined study period because the firm’s stock price before the beginning of the 
study period already reflects the anticipation of firm-specific news.  There is less “surprise” and thus less 
price movement when firm-specific events occur during the study period.  Extending the insights of 
Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010),63 two different types of information are relevant in this context:  (1) the 
“base” of information generally available about a corporation and (2) the “flow” of information during a 
researcher’s study period that affects the incorporation of firm-specific news.  
The results64 of the regressions performed in this study are instructive and reveal that firms that 
are larger and older, that have higher trading volume and more research coverage, that pay higher 
dividends relative to book equity, and that have a higher proportion of tangible assets tend to have higher 
R2’s.  All of these factors, as discussed previously in Section 4.3, are likely to contribute to a high quality 
information environment and make firms operating in this environment less likely to experience non-
                                                 
63 Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) use the terms “time-variant” characteristics (that is, those factors reflecting the 
current state of the firm) and “time-invariant” characteristics (that is, those characteristics that do not change 
frequently or do not change much over time).  One may think of “time-invariant” characteristics as related to the 
“base” of information or general information environment and “time-variant” characteristics as related to the “flow” 
of information. 
64 Note that this section describes only those characteristics that have a statistically significant relationship with R2 
in the OLS regressions for the overall sample.  Also, note that though sales growth is also a variable that is 
positively associated with R2, the meaning of this result is ambiguous.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that sales 
growth can spur more speculation and hence may be associated with less accurate prices.  However, sales growth is 
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market-related stock movements during the study.65  This study also reveals that firms with higher 
ownership by 5% holders, higher levels of R&D, and higher book-to-market ratios tend to have lower 
R2’s.  The presence of these characteristics, as discussed previously, is often associated with a poor 
quality information environment.   
All of the traits mentioned in the prior paragraph bear a statistically significant relationship with 
R2, either positive or negative, and this is a result that appears to be consistent with the hypothesis of 
Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010).  Firms with characteristics that are consistent with a high quality 
information environment tend to have higher R2’s.  Conversely, firms with traits associated with low 
quality information environments tend to have lower R2’s.  These factors all relate to the “base” of 
information about a firm.   
As Durnev et al. (2003) note, information about firm fundamentals is incorporated into stock 
prices in two ways:  through a general revaluation of firm value following a public news release and 
through investor trading activity following the attainment of private information.66  Therefore, this Article 
also provides evidence on the relationship between R2 and two firm characteristics that relate to the 
“flow” of information into a firm’s stock price:  dissemination of firm-specific news and retail trading 
activity. 
The results of this study reveal that higher numbers of news days are associated with lower R2.  
Even firms in high quality information environments are not completely transparent;  the market cannot 
anticipate fully all future firm-specific events.  Therefore, the presence or absence of firm-specific news is 
important in explaining stock movements.  News coverage reflects events affecting the firm during the 
study period, such as M&A activity, new customers, or new contract awards.  Thus, finding that more 
                                                 
65  Recall the argument of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010).  For firms in high quality information environments, as 
firm-specific events occur over a defined period of time (such as a limited study period), the stock prices of such 
firms will move principally with the overall market because investors already will have anticipated firm-specific 
events, and such expectations will be reflected in the pre-study period price. 
66 Traders likely are more influential on the incorporation of fundamentals into stock prices than is the release of 
news items.  Roll (1988) notes that individual firm-specific stock price movements generally are not correlated with 
an identifiable public dissemination of news.  Thus, Roll argues, trading activity based on investor knowledge and 
beliefs informed by private information or, alternatively, due to noise, are likely more instrumental in stock price 
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firm-specific news is associated with a firm’s stock returns tracking the broader market less closely is 
unsurprising.67  News releases are a clear example of an item affecting the “flow” of information into 
stock prices.68   
As noted above, retail trading levels also affect the “flow” of information in stock prices.  A 
higher proportion of retail trading generally correlates with a greater number of individuals influencing 
asset prices.69  This, of course, directly affects the flow of information into stock prices.  This study 
demonstrates that, just as was the case with greater news coverage, higher levels of retail trading on a 
proportional basis are associated with lower R2. 
Critics of the prevailing view regarding the correct interpretation of R2 typically point to 
implausible correlations between firm characteristics such as small size or less research coverage, on one 
hand, and low R2, on the other, if low R2 is indeed a sign of informational efficiency.  The preceding 
analysis, building on the work of Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010), takes a step toward explaining these 
apparent anomalies.  Characteristics consistent with high quality information environments (the “base”) 
are associated with high R2’s and characteristics consistent with increased information flow are associated 
with low R2’s.  The above analysis does not prove that low R2 is a sign of share price informedness, but 
the evidence on the relationship between an information flow characteristic such as news coverage and R2 
suggests that one cannot rule that interpretation out as a possibility.  Nor can one reject the possibility that 
trading by retail investors (also associated with low R2) increases share price accuracy. 
Though inconsistent with the conventional wisdom, one could construct a plausible account of 
how the presence of a greater proportion of individual investors increases share price accuracy.  Even if 
individual investors occasionally or even frequently trade based on noise, they still have information that 
                                                 
67 Of course, if Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) are correct, then the firms whose stock prices will move the most in 
reaction to news releases are firms operating in relatively low quality (less transparent) information environments. 
68 Though news coverage is primarily a “flow” of information characteristic as it relates to firm-specific events, it is 
true that some companies (for example, large firms, firms in popular industries) are more apt, holding all else equal, 
to attract media attention. 
69 Because retail investors generally buy and sell smaller numbers of shares than institutions, for any given level of 
trading volume, a higher proportion of retail traders in a stock translates into more separate individuals making a 
judgment on stock price valuation. 
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can be valuable in helping the market set prices (see, for example, La Blanc and Rachlinski 2005; Manne 
2006; Surowiecki 2004).  Thus, average securities prices are more accurate when markets are open, not 
only to a relatively limited group of investment professionals, but also to all who contribute their bit of 
knowledge, no matter how small.  The findings of Jackson (2003) and Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001), 
described in Section 2, are consistent with this view. 
Despite the foregoing, it is possible that low R2 is not a sign of share price accuracy and that retail 
investors are associated with greater noise in market prices.  However, even if individual investors, as a 
group, tend to be noise traders, it does not necessarily follow that market efficiency would be enhanced 
by excluding retail investors.  Market efficiency requires not only accurate prices, but also liquidity 
(Goshen and Parchomovsky 2006).  Of course, eliminating large numbers of investors, of any type, from 
the market would have significant liquidity implications,70 and there is evidence that retail investors 
perform unique market functions (see, for example, Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) for a discussion of 
ways in which individuals provide liquidity for institutional investors).  However, putting that very 
significant issue aside, noise trading itself can perform a vital role in the functioning of financial markets 
and contribute to market liquidity.  If the only trades that occurred were those based on relevant 
information and all traders had access to (and could act on) the same information, no one, other than for 
liquidity reasons, would have reason to trade (see Black 1986).  Thus, noise trading makes markets more 
liquid as informed traders attempt to exploit inefficiencies in markets caused by noise trading (Black 
1986).71  Noise trading also indirectly aids in price accuracy, as noise traders make it worthwhile for 
informed traders to acquire and trade on information that ultimately will make share prices more 
reflective of fundamental value (La Blanc and Rachlinski 2005).72   
                                                 
70 This is especially true with respect to small firm stocks, for which liquidity often is a significant problem. 
71 On the other hand, limits to arbitrage may make informed traders less willing to trade in the face of large amounts 
of noise trading (De Long et al. 1990, 703) (“The unpredictability of noise traders’ beliefs creates a risk in the price 
of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them.”).   
72 Unfortunately, the way noise traders make this worthwhile for informed traders is by suffering losses in trades 
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Assuming there is a causal relationship between individual investor market participation and R2, 
no matter what the interpretation of R2,73 this study provides further evidence that the trading behavior of 
individual investors plays an important role in market efficiency.  Retail trades, even when small as a 
percentage of total volume, can have significant market effects.   
 
                                                 
73 In addition to the interpretations of R2 primarily described in this Article, it is possible, of course, that the R2 
metric is devoid of meaning (that is, is neither a sign of share price accuracy or increased noise) and is entirely 
random.  Though theoretically possible, because many researchers have found statistically significant relationships 
between R2 and a number of different variables, R2 likely is a meaningful metric.   
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Overall Sample Top Half Bottom Half 
Mean 0.287 0.326 0.247 
Std. Dev. 0.177 0.190 0.153 
Minimum 0.0005 0.036 0.0005 
R2 
Maximum 0.856 0.856 0.827 
Independent Variables of Interest     
Mean 0.011 0.008 0.015 
Std. Dev. 0.011 0.006 0.014 
Minimum 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Ratio of Retail Buy-side Shares 
      to Total Daily Volume 
Maximum 0.099 0.055 0.099 
Mean 0.017 0.012 0.021 
Std. Dev. 0.015 0.009 0.018 
Minimum 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Ratio of Retail Sell-side Shares 
      to Total Daily Volume 
Maximum 0.117 0.110 0.117 
Control Variables     
Mean 0.722 0.714 0.729 
Std. Dev. 0.216 0.199 0.231 
Minimum 0.020 0.020 0.026 
Institutional Ownership % 
Maximum 1.723 1.723 1.267 
Mean 8,796 16,525 1,054 
Std. Dev. 24,056 32,207 590 
Minimum 79 2,308 79 
Market Capitalization (mm) 
Maximum 375,773 375,773 2,299 
Mean 1,386,455 2,332,806 438,425 
Std. Dev. 2,786,927 3,664,238 558,481 
Minimum 9,023 14,800 9,023 
Total Daily Trading Volume 
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Mean 13 18 8 
Std. Dev. 8 8 5 
Minimum 1 2 1 
Research Coverage 
Maximum 47 47 35 
Mean 449 658 240 
Std. Dev. 404 443 210 
Minimum 1 32 1 
Research Activity 
Maximum 2,498 2,498 1,674 
Mean 0.069 0.052 0.086 
Std. Dev. 0.144 0.140 0.145 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Insider Ownership 
Maximum .9999 .9999 .9999 
Mean 0.353 0.290 0.419 
Std. Dev. 0.223 0.203 0.224 
Minimum 0 0 0 
5% Owner Ownership 
Maximum .9999 .9999 .9999 
Mean 3 4 3 
Std. Dev. 1.681 1.727 1.578 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Industry Groups 
(Four-Digit SIC Codes) 
Maximum 7 7 7 
Mean 34 47 22 
Std. Dev. 44 58 13 
Minimum 0 3 0 
News Days 
Maximum 369 369 112 
Mean 311 369 252 
Std. Dev. 247 271 204 
Minimum 15 15 15 
Age (in months) 
Maximum 951 951 951 
Mean 0.083 0.069 0.098 
Std. Dev. 0.038 0.027 0.041 
Minimum 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Volatility 
(Standard Deviation of Monthly Returns) 









Mean 0.145 0.225 0.065 
Std. Dev. 1.043 1.421 0.378 
Minimum -6.143 -1.661 -6.143 
Return on Equity 
Maximum 33.255 33.255 1.836 
Mean 0.055 0.066 0.044 
Std. Dev. 0.649 0.752 0.526 
Minimum -.870 -.136 -.870 
Dividends-to-Equity 
Maximum 17.823 17.823 12.298 
Mean 0.565 0.559 0.570 
Std. Dev. 0.396 0.399 0.394 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tangible Assets to Total Assets 
Maximum 2.709 1.868 2.709 
Mean 0.027 0.029 0.025 
Std. Dev. 0.037 0.036 0.038 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R&D to Assets 
Maximum 0.367 0.173 0.367 
Mean 0.491 0.414 0.568 
Std. Dev. 0.446 0.278 0.556 
Minimum -6.769 -0.454 -6.769 
Book-to-Market Equity 
Maximum 4.092 2.305 4.092 
Mean 0.040 0.044 0.035 
Std. Dev. 0.385 0.148 0.524 
Minimum -11.687 -1.623 -11.687 
External Financing 
Maximum 0.768 0.751 0.768 
Mean 0.153 0.152 0.154 
Std. Dev. 0.207 0.194 0.220 
Minimum -0.903 -0.351 -0.903 
Sales Growth 
Maximum 1.846 1.846 1.683 
Instrumental Variable     
Mean 37.80 48.80 26.77 
Std. Dev. 37.52 47.10 18.81 
Minimum 1.59 2.75 1.59 
Stock Price 
Maximum 790.33 790.33 287.43 
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Correlation Matrix for Overall Sample 
 
 Retail 
























      
 
   






              




















































































































































 1      


















































































































































NOTE.—The table above reports pairwise correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in the analysis of the relationship between R2 and retail trading for the overall 
sample.  The numbers in parentheses signify the probability levels at which one may reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation in two-tailed tests.  +, *, and ** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3 
Estimates of the Relationship between R2 and Retail Trading Activity 
 
 Retail Trading 
 
Overall 
Sample Top Half 
Bottom 
Half 

































































































































































F-Statistic 25.33 18.54 10.43 
R2 0.32 0.33 0.32 
No. of observations 1129 565 564 
 
NOTE.—The table above reports ordinary least squares regression results for the overall sample and for 
segments of the sample determined by size (based on average market capitalization during the study 
period).  The segments are “Top Half” (largest - top 50%) and “Bottom Half” (smallest - bottom 
50%).  +, *, and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Numbers in 
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Table 4 
Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Relationship between R2 and Retail Trading Activity 
 
 Overall Sample Top Half Bottom Half 






























































































































































































































































































































































observations: 1129  565  564  
NOTE.—The table above reports the results of a regression of R2 on retail trading for the overall sample and for segments of the sample 
determined by size (based on the average market capitalization during the study period), estimated using 2SLS (two-stage least 
squares regression).  The segments are “Top Half” (largest – top 50%) and “Bottom Half” (smallest – bottom 50%).  Stock price is 
used as an instrument for retail trading.  Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics or z-scores.  Numbers in 
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